part in her government.]

Observe, Glaucon, that there will be no injustice in compelling our

philosophers to have a care and providence of others; we shall explain to

them that in other States, men *520B* of their class are not obliged to

share in the toils of politics: and this is reasonable, for they grow up

at their own sweet will, and the government would rather not have them.

Being self-taught, they cannot be expected to show any gratitude for a

culture which they have never received. But we have brought you into the

world to be rulers of the hive, kings of yourselves and of the other

citizens, and have educated you far better and more perfectly than they

have been educated, and you are better able to share in the double duty.

*520C* Wherefore each of you, when his turn comes, must go down to the

general underground abode, and get the habit of seeing in the dark. When

you have acquired the habit, you will see ten thousand times better than

the inhabitants of the den, and you will know what the several images are,

and what they represent, because you have seen the beautiful and just and

good in their truth. And thus our State, which is also yours, will be a

reality, and not a dream {221} only, and will be administered in a spirit

unlike that of other States, in which men fight with one another about

shadows only and are distracted in the struggle for power, *520D* which in

their eyes is a great good. Whereas the truth is that the State in which

the rulers are most reluctant to govern is always the best and most

quietly governed, and the State in which they are most eager, the worst.

Quite true, he replied.

And will our pupils, when they hear this, refuse to take their turn at the

toils of State, when they are allowed to spend the greater part of their

time with one another in the heavenly light?

[Sidenote: They will be willing but not anxious to rule.]

*520E* Impossible, he answered; for they are just men, and the commands

which we impose upon them are just; there can be no doubt that every one

of them will take office as a stern necessity, and not after the fashion

of our present rulers of State.

[Sidenote: The statesman must be provided with a better life than that of

a ruler; and then he will not covet office.]

Yes, my friend, I said; and there lies the point. You *521A* must contrive

for your future rulers another and a better life than that of a ruler, and

then you may have a well-ordered State; for only in the State which offers

this, will they rule who are truly rich, not in silver and gold, but in

virtue and wisdom, which are the true blessings of life. Whereas if they

go to the administration of public affairs, poor and hungering after their

own private advantage, thinking that hence they are to snatch the chief

good, order there can never be; for they will be fighting about office,

and the civil and domestic broils which thus arise will be the ruin of the

rulers themselves and of the whole State.

Most true, he replied.

*521B* And the only life which looks down upon the life of political

ambition is that of true philosophy. Do you know of any other?

Indeed, I do not, he said.

And those who govern ought not to be lovers of the task? For, if they are,

there will be rival lovers, and they will fight.

No question.

Who then are those whom we shall compel to be guardians? Surely they will

be the men who are wisest about affairs of {222} State, and by whom the

State is best administered, and who at the same time have other honours

and another and a better life than that of politics?

They are the men, and I will choose them, he replied.

*521C* And now shall we consider in what way such guardians will be

produced, and how they are to be brought from darkness to light,--as some

are said to have ascended from the world below to the gods?

By all means, he replied.

[Sidenote: The training of the guardians.]

The process, I said, is not the turning over of an oyster-shell[2], but

the turning round of a soul passing from a day which is little better than

night to the true day of being, that is, the ascent from below[3], which

we affirm to be true philosophy?

[Footnote 2: In allusion to a game in which two parties fled or pursued

according as an oyster-shell which was thrown into the air fell with the

dark or light side uppermost.]

[Footnote 3: Reading [Greek: ou)=san e)pa/nodon].]

Quite so.

And should we not enquire what sort of knowledge has the *521D* power of

effecting such a change?

Certainly.

[Sidenote: What knowledge will draw the soul upwards?]

What sort of knowledge is there which would draw the soul from becoming to

being? And another consideration has just occurred to me: You will

remember that our young men are to be warrior athletes?

Yes, that was said.

Then this new kind of knowledge must have an additional quality?

What quality?

Usefulness in war.

Yes, if possible.

[Sidenote: Recapitulation.]

There were two parts in our former scheme of education, *521E* were there

not?

[Sidenote: There were two parts in our former scheme of education, were

there not?]

Just so.

There was gymnastic which presided over the growth and decay of the body,

and may therefore be regarded as having to do with generation and

corruption?

True.

*522A* Then that is not the knowledge which we are seeking to discover?

{223}

No.

But what do you say of music, which also entered to a certain extent into

our former scheme?

Music, he said, as you will remember, was the counterpart of gymnastic,

and trained the guardians by the influences of habit, by harmony making

them harmonious, by rhythm rhythmical, but not giving them science; and

the words, whether fabulous or possibly true, had kindred elements of

rhythm and harmony in them. But in music there was *522B* nothing which

tended to that good which you are now seeking.

You are most accurate, I said, in your recollection; in music there

certainly was nothing of the kind. But what branch of knowledge is there,

my dear Glaucon, which is of the desired nature; since all the useful arts

were reckoned mean by us?

Undoubtedly; and yet if music and gymnastic are excluded, and the arts are

also excluded, what remains?

Well, I said, there may be nothing left of our special subjects; and then

we shall have to take something which is not special, but of universal

application.

What may that be?

[Sidenote: There remains for the second education, arithmetic;]

*522C* A something which all arts and sciences and intelligences use in

common, and which every one first has to learn among the elements of

education.

What is that?

The little matter of distinguishing one, two, and three--in a word, number

and calculation:--do not all arts and sciences necessarily partake of

them?

Yes.

Then the art of war partakes of them?

To be sure.

*522D* Then Palamedes, whenever he appears in tragedy, proves Agamemnon

ridiculously unfit to be a general. Did you never remark how he declares

that he had invented number, and had numbered the ships and set in array

the ranks of the army at Troy; which implies that they had never been

numbered before, and Agamemnon must be supposed literally to have been

incapable of counting his own feet--how could he if he was ignorant of

number? And if that is true, what sort of general must he have been? {224}

I should say a very strange one, if this was as you say.

*522E* Can we deny that a warrior should have a knowledge of arithmetic?

Certainly he should, if he is to have the smallest understanding of

military tactics, or indeed, I should rather say, if he is to be a man at

all.

I should like to know whether you have the same notion which I have of

this study?

What is your notion?

[Sidenote: that being a study which leads naturally to reflection, for]

It appears to me to be a study of the kind which we are *523A* seeking,

and which leads naturally to reflection, but never to have been rightly

used; for the true use of it is simply to draw the soul towards being.

Will you explain your meaning? he said.

I will try, I said; and I wish you would share the enquiry with me, and

say 'yes' or 'no' when I attempt to distinguish in my own mind what

branches of knowledge have this attracting power, in order that we may

have clearer proof that arithmetic is, as I suspect, one of them.

Explain, he said.

[Sidenote: reflection is aroused by contradictory impressions of sense.]

I mean to say that objects of sense are of two kinds; some *523B* of them

do not invite thought because the sense is an adequate judge of them;

while in the case of other objects sense is so untrustworthy that further

enquiry is imperatively demanded.

You are clearly referring, he said, to the manner in which the senses are

imposed upon by distance, and by painting in light and shade.

No, I said, that is not at all my meaning.

Then what is your meaning?

When speaking of uninviting objects, I mean those which *523C* do not pass

from one sensation to the opposite; inviting objects are those which do;

in this latter case the sense coming upon the object, whether at a

distance or near, gives no more vivid idea of anything in particular than

of its opposite. An illustration will make my meaning clearer:--here are

three fingers--a little finger, a second finger, and a middle finger.

Very good. {225}

You may suppose that they are seen quite close: And here comes the point.

What is it?

[Sidenote: No difficulty in simple perception.]

Each of them equally appears a finger, whether seen in the *523D* middle

or at the extremity, whether white or black, or thick or thin--it makes no

difference; a finger is a finger all the same. In these cases a man is not

compelled to ask of thought the question what is a finger? for the sight

never intimates to the mind that a finger is other than a finger.

True.

And therefore, I said, as we might expect, there is nothing *523E* here

which invites or excites intelligence.

There is not, he said.

[Sidenote: But the same senses at the same time give different impressions

which are at first indistinct and have to be distinguished by the mind.]

But is this equally true of the greatness and smallness of the fingers?

Can sight adequately perceive them? and is no difference made by the

circumstance that one of the fingers is in the middle and another at the

extremity? And in like manner does the touch adequately perceive the

qualities of thickness or thinness, of softness or hardness? And so of the

other senses; do they give perfect intimations of such matters? *524A* Is

not their mode of operation on this wise--the sense which is concerned

with the quality of hardness is necessarily concerned also with the

quality of softness, and only intimates to the soul that the same thing is

felt to be both hard and soft?

You are quite right, he said.

And must not the soul be perplexed at this intimation which the sense

gives of a hard which is also soft? What, again, is the meaning of light

and heavy, if that which is light is also heavy, and that which is heavy,

light?

*524B* Yes, he said, these intimations which the soul receives are very

curious and require to be explained.

[Sidenote: The aid of numbers is invoked in order to remove the

confusion.]

Yes, I said, and in these perplexities the soul naturally summons to her

aid calculation and intelligence, that she may see whether the several

objects announced to her are one or two.

True.

And if they turn out to be two, is not each of them one and different?

Certainly. {226}

And if each is one, and both are two, she will conceive the *524C* two as

in a state of division, for if there were undivided they could only be

conceived of as one?

True.

The eye certainly did see both small and great, but only in a confused

manner; they were not distinguished.

Yes.

[Sidenote: The chaos then begins to be defined.]

Whereas the thinking mind, intending to light up the chaos, was compelled

to reverse the process, and look at small and great as separate and not

confused.

Very true.

Was not this the beginning of the enquiry 'What is great?' and 'What is

small?'

Exactly so.

[Sidenote: The parting of the visible and intelligible.]

And thus arose the distinction of the visible and the intelligible.

*524D* Most true.

This was what I meant when I spoke of impressions which invited the

intellect, or the reverse--those which are simultaneous with opposite

impressions, invite thought; those which are not simultaneous do not.

I understand, he said, and agree with you.

And to which class do unity and number belong?

I do not know, he replied.

[Sidenote: Thought is aroused by the contradiction of the one and many.]

Think a little and you will see that what has preceded will supply the

answer; for if simple unity could be adequately perceived by the sight or

by any other sense, then, *524E* as we were saying in the case of the

finger, there would be nothing to attract towards being; but when there is

some contradiction always present, and one is the reverse of one and

involves the conception of plurality, then thought begins to be aroused

within us, and the soul perplexed and wanting to arrive at a decision asks

'What is absolute unity?' This *525A* is the way in which the study of the

one has a power of drawing and converting the mind to the contemplation of

true being.

And surely, he said, this occurs notably in the case of one; for we see

the same thing to be both one and infinite in multitude?

Yes, I said; and this being true of one must be equally true of all

number? {227}

Certainly.

And all arithmetic and calculation have to do with number?

Yes.

*525B* And they appear to lead the mind towards truth?

Yes, in a very remarkable manner.

[Sidenote: Arithmetic has a practical and also a philosophical use, the

latter the higher.]

Then this is knowledge of the kind for which we are seeking, having a

double use, military and philosophical; for the man of war must learn the

art of number or he will not know how to array his troops, and the

philosopher also, because he has to rise out of the sea of change and lay

hold of true being, and therefore he must be an arithmetician.

That is true.

And our guardian is both warrior and philosopher?

Certainly.

Then this is a kind of knowledge which legislation may fitly prescribe;

and we must endeavour to persuade those *525C* who are to be the principal

men of our State to go and learn arithmetic, not as amateurs, but they

must carry on the study until they see the nature of numbers with the mind

only; nor again, like merchants or retail-traders, with a view to buying

or selling, but for the sake of their military use, and of the soul

herself; and because this will be the easiest way for her to pass from

becoming to truth and being.

That is excellent, he said.

Yes, I said, and now having spoken of it, I must add *525D* how charming

the science is! and in how many ways it conduces to our desired end, if

pursued in the spirit of a philosopher, and not of a shopkeeper!

How do you mean?

[Sidenote: The higher arithmetic is concerned, not with visible or

tangible objects, but with abstract numbers.]

I mean, as I was saying, that arithmetic has a very great and elevating

effect, compelling the soul to reason about abstract number, and rebelling

against the introduction of visible or tangible objects into the argument.

You know *525E* how steadily the masters of the art repel and ridicule any

one who attempts to divide absolute unity when he is calculating, and if

you divide, they multiply[4], taking care that one shall continue one and

not become lost in fractions. {228}

[Footnote 4: Meaning either (1) that they integrate the number because

they deny the possibility of fractions; or (2) that division is regarded

by them as a process of multiplication, for the fractions of one continue

to be units.]

That is very true.

*526A* Now, suppose a person were to say to them: O my friends, what are

these wonderful numbers about which you are reasoning, in which, as you

say, there is a unity such as you demand, and each unit is equal,

invariable, indivisible,--what would they answer?

They would answer, as I should conceive, that they were speaking of those

numbers which can only be realized in thought.

Then you see that this knowledge may be truly called *526B* necessary,

necessitating as it clearly does the use of the pure intelligence in the

attainment of pure truth?

Yes; that is a marked characteristic of it.

[Sidenote: The arithmetician is naturally quick, and the study of

arithmetic gives him still greater quickness.]

And have you further observed, that those who have a natural talent for

calculation are generally quick at every other kind of knowledge; and even

the dull, if they have had an arithmetical training, although they may

derive no other advantage from it, always become much quicker than they

would otherwise have been.

Very true, he said.

*526C* And indeed, you will not easily find a more difficult study, and

not many as difficult.

You will not.

And, for all these reasons, arithmetic is a kind of knowledge in which the

best natures should be trained, and which must not be given up.

I agree.

Let this then be made one of our subjects of education. And next, shall we

enquire whether the kindred science also concerns us?

You mean geometry?

Exactly so.

[Sidenote: Geometry has practical applications;]

*526D* Clearly, he said, we are concerned with that part of geometry which

relates to war; for in pitching a camp, or taking up a position, or

closing or extending the lines of an army, or any other military

manoeuvre, whether in actual battle or on a march, it will make all the

difference whether a general is or is not a geometrician.

[Sidenote: these however are trifling in comparison with that greater part

of the science which tends towards the good,]

Yes, I said, but for that purpose a very little of either geometry or

calculation will be enough; the question relates {229} rather to the

greater and more advanced part of geometry-- *526E* whether that tends in

any degree to make more easy the vision of the idea of good; and thither,

as I was saying, all things tend which compel the soul to turn her gaze

towards that place, where is the full perfection of being, which she

ought, by all means, to behold.

True, he said.

Then if geometry compels us to view being, it concerns us; if becoming

only, it does not concern us?

*527A* Yes, that is what we assert.

Yet anybody who has the least acquaintance with geometry will not deny

that such a conception of the science is in flat contradiction to the

ordinary language of geometricians.

How so?

They have in view practice only, and are always speaking, in a narrow and

ridiculous manner, of squaring and extending and applying and the

like--they confuse the necessities of geometry with those of daily life;

whereas knowledge is the *527B* real object of the whole science.

Certainly, he said.

Then must not a further admission be made?

What admission?

[Sidenote: and is concerned with the eternal.]

That the knowledge at which geometry aims is knowledge of the eternal, and

not of aught perishing and transient.

That, he replied, may be readily allowed, and is true.

Then, my noble friend, geometry will draw the soul towards truth, and

create the spirit of philosophy, and raise up that which is now unhappily

allowed to fall down.

Nothing will be more likely to have such an effect.

*527C* Then nothing should be more sternly laid down than that the

inhabitants of your fair city should by all means learn geometry. Moreover

the science has indirect effects, which are not small.

Of what kind? he said.

There are the military advantages of which you spoke, I said; and in all

departments of knowledge, as experience proves, any one who has studied

geometry is infinitely quicker of apprehension than one who has not.

Yes indeed, he said, there is an infinite difference between them. {230}

Then shall we propose this as a second branch of knowledge which our youth

will study?

Let us do so, he replied.

*527D* And suppose we make astronomy the third--what do you say?

[Sidenote: Astronomy, like the previous sciences, is at first praised by

Glaucon for its practical uses.]

I am strongly inclined to it, he said; the observation of the seasons and

of months and years is as essential to the general as it is to the farmer

or sailor.

I am amused, I said, at your fear of the world, which makes you guard

against the appearance of insisting upon useless studies; and I quite

admit the difficulty of believing that in every man there is an eye of the

soul which, when by *527E* other pursuits lost and dimmed, is by these

purified and re-illumined; and is more precious far than ten thousand

bodily eyes, for by it alone is truth seen. Now there are two classes of

persons: one class of those who will agree with you and will take your

words as a revelation; another class *528A* to whom they will be utterly

unmeaning, and who will naturally deem them to be idle tales, for they see

no sort of profit which is to be obtained from them. And therefore you had

better decide at once with which of the two you are proposing to argue.

You will very likely say with neither, and that your chief aim in carrying

on the argument is your own improvement; at the same time you do not

grudge to others any benefit which they may receive.

I think that I should prefer to carry on the argument mainly on my own

behalf.

[Sidenote: Correction of the order.]

Then take a step backward, for we have gone wrong in the order of the

sciences.

What was the mistake? he said.

After plane geometry, I said, we proceeded at once to *528B* solids in

revolution, instead of taking solids in themselves; whereas after the

second dimension the third, which is concerned with cubes and dimensions

of depth, ought to have followed.

That is true, Socrates; but so little seems to be known as yet about these

subjects.

[Sidenote: The pitiable condition of solid geometry.]

Why, yes, I said, and for two reasons:--in the first place, no government

patronises them; this leads to a want of energy in the pursuit of them,

and they are difficult; in the {231} second place, students cannot learn

them unless they have a director. But then a director can hardly be found,

and even *528C* if he could, as matters now stand, the students, who are

very conceited, would not attend to him. That, however, would be otherwise

if the whole State became the director of these studies and gave honour to

them; then disciples would want to come, and there would be continuous and

earnest search, and discoveries would be made; since even now, disregarded

as they are by the world, and maimed of their fair proportions, and

although none of their votaries can tell the use of them, still these

studies force their way by their natural charm, and very likely, if they

had the help of the State, they would some day emerge into light.

*528D* Yes, he said, there is a remarkable charm in them. But I do not

clearly understand the change in the order. First you began with a

geometry of plane surfaces?

Yes, I said.

And you placed astronomy next, and then you made a step backward?

[Sidenote: The motion of solids.]

Yes, and I have delayed you by my hurry; the ludicrous state of solid

geometry, which, in natural order, should have followed, made me pass over

this branch and go on to *528E* astronomy, or motion of solids.

True, he said.

Then assuming that the science now omitted would come into existence if

encouraged by the State, let us go on to astronomy, which will be fourth.

[Sidenote: Glaucon grows sentimental about astronomy.]

The right order, he replied. And now, Socrates, as you rebuked the vulgar

manner in which I praised astronomy *529A* before, my praise shall be

given in your own spirit. For every one, as I think, must see that

astronomy compels the soul to look upwards and leads us from this world to

another.

Every one but myself, I said; to every one else this may be clear, but not

to me.

And what then would you say?

I should rather say that those who elevate astronomy into philosophy

appear to me to make us look downwards and not upwards.

What do you mean? he asked. {232}

[Sidenote: He is rebuked by Socrates,]

You, I replied, have in your mind a truly sublime conception of our

knowledge of the things above. And I dare *529B* say that if a person were

to throw his head back and study the fretted ceiling, you would still

think that his mind was the percipient, and not his eyes. And you are very

likely right, and I may be a simpleton: but, in my opinion, that knowledge

only which is of being and of the unseen can make the soul look upwards,

and whether a man gapes at the heavens or blinks on the ground, seeking to

learn some particular of sense, I would deny that he can learn, for *529C*

nothing of that sort is matter of science; his soul is looking downwards,

not upwards, whether his way to knowledge is by water or by land, whether

he floats, or only lies on his back.

[Sidenote: who explains that the higher astronomy is an abstract science.]

I acknowledge, he said, the justice of your rebuke. Still, I should like

to ascertain how astronomy can be learned in any manner more conducive to

that knowledge of which we are speaking?

I will tell you, I said: The starry heaven which we behold is wrought upon

a visible ground, and therefore, *529D* although the fairest and most

perfect of visible things, must necessarily be deemed inferior far to the

true motions of absolute swiftness and absolute slowness, which are

relative to each other, and carry with them that which is contained in

them, in the true number and in every true figure. Now, these are to be

apprehended by reason and intelligence, but not by sight.

True, he replied.

The spangled heavens should be used as a pattern and with a view to that

higher knowledge; their beauty is like *529E* the beauty of figures or

pictures excellently wrought by the hand of Daedalus, or some other great

artist, which we may chance to behold; any geometrician who saw them would

appreciate the exquisiteness of their workmanship, but he would never

dream of thinking that in them he could find the true equal or the true

double, or the truth of any *530A* other proportion.

No, he replied, such an idea would be ridiculous.

And will not a true astronomer have the same feeling when he looks at the

movements of the stars? Will he not think that heaven and the things in

heaven are framed by the {233} Creator of them in the most perfect manner?

But he will never imagine that the proportions of night and day, or of

both to the month, or of the month to the year, or of the *530B* stars to

these and to one another, and any other things that are material and

visible can also be eternal and subject to no deviation--that would be

absurd; and it is equally absurd to take so much pains in investigating

their exact truth.

I quite agree, though I never thought of this before.

[Sidenote: The real knowledge of astronomy or geometry is to be attained

by the use of abstractions.]

Then, I said, in astronomy, as in geometry, we should employ problems, and

let the heavens alone if we would approach the subject in the right way

and so make the *530C* natural gift of reason to be of any real use.

That, he said, is a work infinitely beyond our present astronomers.

Yes, I said; and there are many other things which must also have a

similar extension given to them, if our legislation is to be of any value.

But can you tell me of any other suitable study?

No, he said, not without thinking.

Motion, I said, has many forms, and not one only; two of *530D* them are

obvious enough even to wits no better than ours; and there are others, as

I imagine, which may be left to wiser persons.

But where are the two?

There is a second, I said, which is the counterpart of the one already

named.

And what may that be?

[Sidenote: What astronomy is to the eye, harmonics are to the ear.]

The second, I said, would seem relatively to the ears to be what the first

is to the eyes; for I conceive that as the eyes are designed to look up at

the stars, so are the ears to hear harmonious motions; and these are

sister sciences--as the Pythagoreans say, and we, Glaucon, agree with

them?

Yes, he replied.

*530E* But this, I said, is a laborious study, and therefore we had better

go and learn of them; and they will tell us whether there are any other

applications of these sciences. At the same time, we must not lose sight

of our own higher object.

What is that?

[Sidenote: They must be studied with a view to the good and not after the

fashion of the empirics or even of the Pythagoreans.]

There is a perfection which all knowledge ought to reach, {234} and which

our pupils ought also to attain, and not to fall short of, as I was saying

that they did in astronomy. *531A* For in the science of harmony, as you

probably know, the same thing happens. The teachers of harmony compare the

sounds and consonances which are heard only, and their labour, like that

of the astronomers, is in vain.

Yes, by heaven! he said; and 'tis as good as a play to hear them talking

about their condensed notes, as they call them; they put their ears close

alongside of the strings like persons catching a sound from their

neighbour's wall[5]--one set of them declaring that they distinguish an

intermediate note and have found the least interval which should be the

unit of measurement; the others insisting that the two sounds have passed

into the same--either party setting *531B* their ears before their

understanding.

[Footnote 5: Or, 'close alongside of their neighbour's instruments, as if

to catch a sound from them.']

You mean, I said, those gentlemen who tease and torture the strings and

rack them on the pegs of the instrument: I might carry on the metaphor and

speak after their manner of the blows which the plectrum gives, and make

accusations against the strings, both of backwardness and forwardness to

sound; but this would be tedious, and therefore I will only say that these

are not the men, and that I am referring to the Pythagoreans, of whom

I was just now proposing to enquire about harmony. For they too are in

error, like the *531C* astronomers; they investigate the numbers of the

harmonies which are heard, but they never attain to problems--that is to

say, they never reach the natural harmonies of number, or reflect why some

numbers are harmonious and others not.

That, he said, is a thing of more than mortal knowledge.

A thing, I replied, which I would rather call useful; that is, if sought

after with a view to the beautiful and good; but if pursued in any other

spirit, useless.

Very true, he said.

[Sidenote: All these studies must be correlated with one another.]

Now, when all these studies reach the point of inter-communion *531D* and

connection with one another, and come to be considered in their mutual

affinities, then, I think, but not till then, will the pursuit of them

have a value for our objects; otherwise there is no profit in them. {235}

I suspect so; but you are speaking, Socrates, of a vast work.

What do you mean? I said; the prelude or what? Do you not know that all

this is but the prelude to the actual strain which we have to learn? For

you surely would not *531E* regard the skilled mathematician as a

dialectician?

[Sidenote: Want of reasoning power in mathematicians.]

Assuredly not, he said; I have hardly ever known a mathematician who was

capable of reasoning.

But do you imagine that men who are unable to give and take a reason will

have the knowledge which we require of them?

Neither can this be supposed.

[Sidenote: Dialectic proceeds by reason only, without any help of sense.]

*532A* And so, Glaucon, I said, we have at last arrived at the hymn of

dialectic. This is that strain which is of the intellect only, but which

the faculty of sight will nevertheless be found to imitate; for sight, as

you may remember, was imagined by us after a while to behold the real

animals and stars, and last of all the sun himself. And so with dialectic;

when a person starts on the discovery of the absolute by the light of

reason only, and without any assistance of sense, and perseveres *532B*

until by pure intelligence he arrives at the perception of the absolute

good, he at last finds himself at the end of the intellectual world, as in

the case of sight at the end of the visible.

Exactly, he said.

Then this is the progress which you call dialectic?

True.

[Sidenote: The gradual acquirement of dialectic by the pursuit of the arts

anticipated in the allegory of the den.]

But the release of the prisoners from chains, and their translation from

the shadows to the images and to the light, and the ascent from the

underground den to the sun, while in his presence they are vainly trying

to look on animals and plants and the light of the sun, but are able to

perceive *532C* even with their weak eyes the images[6] in the water

(which are divine), and are the shadows of true existence (not shadows of

images cast by a light of fire, which compared with the sun is only an

image)--this power of elevating the highest principle in the soul to the

contemplation of that which is best in existence, with which we may

compare the raising of that {236} faculty which is the very light of the

body to the sight of that which is brightest in the material and visible

world--this power is given, as I was saying, by all that study and pursuit

*532D* of the arts which has been described.

[Footnote 6: Omitting [Greek: e)ntau=tha de\ pro\s phanta/smata]. The word

[Greek: thei=a] is bracketed by Stallbaum.]

I agree in what you are saying, he replied, which may be hard to believe,

yet, from another point of view, is harder still to deny. This, however,

is not a theme to be treated of in passing only, but will have to be

discussed again and again. And so, whether our conclusion be true or

false, let us assume all this, and proceed at once from the prelude or

preamble to the chief strain[7], and describe that in like manner. Say,

then, what is the nature and what are the divisions of *532E* dialectic,

and what are the paths which lead thither; for these paths will also lead

to our final rest.

[Footnote 7: A play upon the word [Greek: no/mos], which means both 'law'

and 'strain.']

[Sidenote: The nature of dialectic can only be revealed to those who have

been students of the preliminary sciences,]

*533A* Dear Glaucon, I said, you will not be able to follow me here,

though I would do my best, and you should behold not an image only but the

absolute truth, according to my notion. Whether what I told you would or

would not have been a reality I cannot venture to say; but you would have

seen something like reality; of that I am confident.

Doubtless, he replied.

But I must also remind you, that the power of dialectic alone can reveal

this, and only to one who is a disciple of the previous sciences.

Of that assertion you may be as confident as of the last.

*533B* And assuredly no one will argue that there is any other method of

comprehending by any regular process all true existence or of ascertaining

what each thing is in its own nature; for the arts in general are

concerned with the desires or opinions of men, or are cultivated with a

view to production and construction, or for the preservation of such

productions and constructions; and as to the mathematical sciences which,

as we were saying, have some apprehension of true being--geometry and the

like--they only dream about *533C* being, but never can they behold the

waking reality so long as they leave the hypotheses which they use

unexamined, and are unable to give an account of them. For when a man

knows not his own first principle, and when the conclusion {237} and

intermediate steps are also constructed out of he knows not what, how can

he imagine that such a fabric of convention can ever become science?

Impossible, he said.

[Sidenote: which are her handmaids.]

Then dialectic, and dialectic alone, goes directly to the first principle

and is the only science which does away with hypotheses in order to make

her ground secure; the eye of *533D* the soul, which is literally buried

in an outlandish slough, is by her gentle aid lifted upwards; and she uses

as handmaids and helpers in the work of conversion, the sciences which we

have been discussing. Custom terms them sciences, but they ought to have

some other name, implying greater clearness than opinion and less

clearness than science: and this, in our previous sketch, was called

understanding. But why *533E* should we dispute about names when we have

realities of such importance to consider?

Why indeed, he said, when any name will do which expresses the thought of

the mind with clearness?

[Sidenote: Two divisions of the mind, intellect and opinion, each having

two subdivisions.]

At any rate, we are satisfied, as before, to have four divisions; two for

intellect and two for opinion, and to call the first division science, the

second understanding, the third belief, and the fourth perception of

shadows, opinion *534A* being concerned with becoming, and intellect with

being; and so to make a proportion:--

As being is to becoming, so is pure intellect to opinion.

And as intellect is to opinion, so is science to belief, and

understanding to the perception of shadows.

But let us defer the further correlation and subdivision of the subjects

of opinion and of intellect, for it will be a long enquiry, many times

longer than this has been.

*534B* As far as I understand, he said, I agree.

And do you also agree, I said, in describing the dialectician as one who

attains a conception of the essence of each thing? And he who does not

possess and is therefore unable to impart this conception, in whatever

degree he fails, may in that degree also be said to fail in intelligence?

Will you admit so much?

Yes, he said; how can I deny it?

[Sidenote: No truth which does not rest on the idea of good]

And you would say the same of the conception of the good? Until the person

is able to abstract and define rationally the {238} *534C* idea of good,

and unless he can run the gauntlet of all objections, and is ready to

disprove them, not by appeals to opinion, but to absolute truth, never

faltering at any step of the argument--unless he can do all this, you

would say that he knows neither the idea of good nor any other good; he

apprehends only a shadow, if anything at all, which is given by opinion

and not by science;--dreaming and slumbering in this life, before he is

well awake here, he *534D* arrives at the world below, and has his final

quietus.

In all that I should most certainly agree with you.

And surely you would not have the children of your ideal State, whom you

are nurturing and educating--if the ideal ever becomes a reality--you

would not allow the future rulers to be like posts[8], having no reason in

them, and yet to be set in authority over the highest matters?

[Footnote 8: [Greek: gramma/s]. literally 'lines,' probably the

starting-point of a race-course.]

Certainly not.

Then you will make a law that they shall have such an education as will

enable them to attain the greatest skill in asking and answering

questions?

*534E* Yes, he said, you and I together will make it.

[Sidenote: ought to have a high place.]

Dialectic, then, as you will agree, is the coping-stone of the sciences,

and is set over them; no other science can be *535A* placed higher--the

nature of knowledge can no further go?

I agree, he said.

But to whom we are to assign these studies, and in what way they are to be

assigned, are questions which remain to be considered.

Yes, clearly.

You remember, I said, how the rulers were chosen before?

Certainly, he said.

The same natures must still be chosen, and the preference again given to

the surest and the bravest, and, if possible, *535B* to the fairest; and,

having noble and generous tempers, they should also have the natural gifts

which will facilitate their education.

And what are these?

[Sidenote: The natural gifts which are required in the dialectician: a

towardly understanding; a good memory; strength of character;]

Such gifts as keenness and ready powers of acquisition; for the mind more

often faints from the severity of study {239} than from the severity of

gymnastics: the toil is more entirely the mind's own, and is not shared

with the body.

Very true, he replied.

*535C* Further, he of whom we are in search should have a good memory, and

be an unwearied solid man who is a lover of labour in any line; or he will

never be able to endure the great amount of bodily exercise and to go

through all the intellectual discipline and study which we require of him.

Certainly, he said; he must have natural gifts.

The mistake at present is, that those who study philosophy have no

vocation, and this, as I was before saying, is the reason why she has

fallen into disrepute: her true sons should take her by the hand and not

bastards.

What do you mean?

[Sidenote: industry;]

*535D* In the first place, her votary should not have a lame or halting

industry--I mean, that he should not be half industrious and half idle:

as, for example, when a man is a lover of gymnastic and hunting, and all

other bodily exercises, but a hater rather than a lover of the labour of

learning or listening or enquiring. Or the occupation to which he devotes

himself may be of an opposite kind, and he may have the other sort of

lameness.

Certainly, he said.

[Sidenote: love of truth;]

And as to truth, I said, is not a soul equally to be deemed *535E* halt

and lame which hates voluntary falsehood and is extremely indignant at

herself and others when they tell lies, but is patient of involuntary

falsehood, and does not mind wallowing like a swinish beast in the mire of

ignorance, and has no shame at being detected?

To be sure.

[Sidenote: the moral virtues.]

*536A* And, again, in respect of temperance, courage, magnificence, and

every other virtue, should we not carefully distinguish between the true

son and the bastard? for where there is no discernment of such qualities

states and individuals unconsciously err; and the state makes a ruler, and

the individual a friend, of one who, being defective in some part of

virtue, is in a figure lame or a bastard.

That is very true, he said.

All these things, then, will have to be carefully considered *536B* by us;

and if only those whom we introduce to this vast {240} system of education

and training are sound in body and mind, justice herself will have nothing

to say against us, and we shall be the saviours of the constitution and of

the State; but, if our pupils are men of another stamp, the reverse will

happen, and we shall pour a still greater flood of ridicule on philosophy

than she has to endure at present.

That would not be creditable.

[Sidenote: Socrates plays a little with himself and his subject.]

Certainly not, I said; and yet perhaps, in thus turning jest into earnest

I am equally ridiculous.

In what respect?

*536C* I had forgotten, I said, that we were not serious, and spoke with

too much excitement. For when I saw philosophy so undeservedly trampled

under foot of men I could not help feeling a sort of indignation at the

authors of her disgrace: and my anger made me too vehement.

Indeed! I was listening, and did not think so.

[Sidenote: For the study of dialectic the young must be selected.]

But I, who am the speaker, felt that I was. And now let me remind you

that, although in our former selection we *536D* chose old men, we must

not do so in this. Solon was under a delusion when he said that a man when

he grows old may learn many things--for he can no more learn much than he

can run much; youth is the time for any extraordinary toil.

Of course.

[Sidenote: The preliminary studies should be commenced in childhood, but

never forced.]

And, therefore, calculation and geometry and all the other elements of

instruction, which are a preparation for dialectic, should be presented to

the mind in childhood; not, however, under any notion of forcing our

system of education.

Why not?

*536E* Because a freeman ought not to be a slave in the acquisition of

knowledge of any kind. Bodily exercise, when compulsory, does no harm to

the body; but knowledge which is acquired under compulsion obtains no hold

on the mind.

Very true.

Then, my good friend, I said, do not use compulsion, but *537A* let early

education be a sort of amusement; you will then be better able to find out

the natural bent.

That is a very rational notion, he said.

Do you remember that the children, too, were to be taken {241} to see the

battle on horseback; and that if there were no danger they were to be

brought close up and, like young hounds, have a taste of blood given them?

Yes, I remember.

The same practice may be followed, I said, in all these things--labours,

lessons, dangers--and he who is most at home in all of them ought to be

enrolled in a select number.

*537B* At what age?

[Sidenote: The necessary gymnastics must be completed first.]

At the age when the necessary gymnastics are over: the period whether of

two or three years which passes in this sort of training is useless for

any other purpose; for sleep and exercise are unpropitious to learning;

and the trial of who is first in gymnastic exercises is one of the most

important tests to which our youth are subjected.

Certainly, he replied.

[Sidenote; At twenty years of age the disciples will begin to be taught

the correlation of the sciences.]

After that time those who are selected from the class of twenty years old

will be promoted to higher honour, and the *537C* sciences which they

learned without any order in their early education will now be brought

together, and they will be able to see the natural relationship of them to

one another and to true being.

Yes, he said, that is the only kind of knowledge which takes lasting root.

Yes, I said; and the capacity for such knowledge is the great criterion of

dialectical talent: the comprehensive mind is always the dialectical.

I agree with you, he said.

[Sidenote: At thirty the most promising will be placed in a select class.]

These, I said, are the points which you must consider; *537D* and those

who have most of this comprehension, and who are most steadfast in their

learning, and in their military and other appointed duties, when they have

arrived at the age of thirty have to be chosen by you out of the select

class, and elevated to higher honour; and you will have to prove them by

the help of dialectic, in order to learn which of them is able to give up

the use of sight and the other senses, and in company with truth to attain

absolute being: And here, my friend, great caution is required.

Why great caution?

[Sidenote: The growth of scepticism]

*537E* Do you not remark, I said, how great is the evil which dialectic

has introduced? {242}

What evil? he said.

The students of the art are filled with lawlessness.

Quite true, he said.

Do you think that there is anything so very unnatural or inexcusable in

their case? or will you make allowance for them?

In what way make allowance?

[Sidenote: in the minds of the young illustrated by the case of a

supposititious son,]

I want you, I said, by way of parallel, to imagine a supposititious son

who is brought up in great wealth; he *538A* is one of a great and

numerous family, and has many flatterers. When he grows up to manhood, he

learns that his alleged are not his real parents; but who the real are he

is unable to discover. Can you guess how he will be likely to behave

towards his flatterers and his supposed parents, first of all during the

period when he is ignorant of the false relation, and then again when he

knows? Or shall I guess for you?

If you please.

[Sidenote: who ceases to honour his father when he discovers that he is

not his father.]

Then I should say, that while he is ignorant of the truth *538B* he will

be likely to honour his father and his mother and his supposed relations

more than the flatterers; he will be less inclined to neglect them when in

need, or to do or say anything against them; and he will be less willing

to disobey them in any important matter.

He will.

But when he has made the discovery, I should imagine that he would

diminish his honour and regard for them, and would become more devoted to

the flatterers; their influence over him would greatly increase; he would

now live after *538C* their ways, and openly associate with them, and,

unless he were of an unusually good disposition, he would trouble himself

no more about his supposed parents or other relations.

Well, all that is very probable. But how is the image applicable to the

disciples of philosophy?

In this way: you know that there are certain principles about justice and

honour, which were taught us in childhood, and under their parental

authority we have been brought up, obeying and honouring them.

That is true.

*538D* There are also opposite maxims and habits of pleasure {243} which

flatter and attract the soul, but do not influence those of us who have

any sense of right, and they continue to obey and honour the maxims of

their fathers.

True.

[Sidenote: So men who begin to analyse the first principles of morality

cease to respect them.]

Now, when a man is in this state, and the questioning spirit asks what is

fair or honourable, and he answers as the legislator has taught him, and

then arguments many and diverse refute his words, until he is driven into

believing that nothing is honourable any more than dishonourable, or

*538E* just and good any more than the reverse, and so of all the notions

which he most valued, do you think that he will still honour and obey them

as before?

Impossible.

And when he ceases to think them honourable and natural *539A* as

heretofore, and he fails to discover the true, can he be expected to

pursue any life other than that which flatters his desires?

He cannot.

And from being a keeper of the law he is converted into a breaker of it?

Unquestionably.

Now all this is very natural in students of philosophy such as I have

described, and also, as I was just now saying, most excusable.

Yes, he said; and, I may add, pitiable.

Therefore, that your feelings may not be moved to pity about our citizens

who are now thirty years of age, every care must be taken in introducing

them to dialectic.

Certainly.

[Sidenote: Young men are fond of pulling truth to pieces and thus bring

disgrace upon themselves and upon philosophy.]

*539B* There is a danger lest they should taste the dear delight too

early; for youngsters, as you may have observed, when they first get the

taste in their mouths, argue for amusement, and are always contradicting

and refuting others in imitation of those who refute them; like

puppy-dogs, they rejoice in pulling and tearing at all who come near them.

Yes, he said, there is nothing which they like better.

And when they have made many conquests and received *539C* defeats at the

hands of many, they violently and speedily get into a way of not believing

anything which they believed before, and hence, not only they, but

philosophy and all that {244} relates to it is apt to have a bad name with

the rest of the world.

Too true, he said.

[Sidenote: The dialectician and the eristic.]

But when a man begins to get older, he will no longer be guilty of such

insanity; he will imitate the dialectician who is seeking for truth, and

not the eristic, who is contradicting for the sake of amusement; and the

greater moderation of his *539D* character will increase instead of

diminishing the honour of the pursuit.

Very true, he said.

And did we not make special provision for this, when we said that the

disciples of philosophy were to be orderly and steadfast, not, as now, any

chance aspirant or intruder?

Very true.

Suppose, I said, the study of philosophy to take the place of gymnastics

and to be continued diligently and earnestly and exclusively for twice the

number of years which were passed in bodily exercise--will that be enough?

*539E* Would you say six or four years? he asked.

[Sidenote: The study of philosophy to continue for five years; 30-35.]

Say five years, I replied; at the end of the time they must be sent down

again into the den and compelled to hold any military or other office

which young men are qualified to hold: in this way they will get their

experience of life, and there will be an opportunity of trying whether,

when they are drawn all manner of ways by temptation, they will stand firm

or flinch.

*540A* And how long is this stage of their lives to last?

[Sidenote: During fifteen years, 35-50, they are to hold office.]

[Sidenote: At the end of that time they are to live chiefly in the

contemplation of the good, but occasionally to return to politics.]

Fifteen years, I answered; and when they have reached fifty years of age,

then let those who still survive and have distinguished themselves in

every action of their lives and in every branch of knowledge come at last

to their consummation: the time has now arrived at which they must raise

the eye of the soul to the universal light which lightens all things, and

behold the absolute good; for that is the pattern according to which they

are to order the State and the *540B* lives of individuals, and the

remainder of their own lives also; making philosophy their chief pursuit,

but, when their turn comes, toiling also at politics and ruling for the

public good, not as though they were performing some heroic {245} action,

but simply as a matter of duty; and when they have brought up in each

generation others like themselves and left them in their place to be

governors of the State, then they will depart to the Islands of the Blest

and dwell there; and the city will give them public memorials and

sacrifices *540C* and honour them, if the Pythian oracle consent, as

demigods, but if not, as in any case blessed and divine.

You are a sculptor, Socrates, and have made statues of our governors

faultless in beauty.

Yes, I said, Glaucon, and of our governesses too; for you must not suppose

that what I have been saying applies to men only and not to women as far

as their natures can go.

There you are right, he said, since we have made them to share in all

things like the men.

*540D* Well, I said, and you would agree (would you not?) that what has

been said about the State and the government is not a mere dream, and

although difficult not impossible, but only possible in the way which has

been supposed; that is to say, when the true philosopher kings are born in

a State, one or more of them, despising the honours of this present world

which they deem mean and worthless, esteeming above all things right and

the honour *540E* that springs from right, and regarding justice as the

greatest and most necessary of all things, whose ministers they are, and

whose principles will be exalted by them when they set in order their own

city?

How will they proceed?

[Sidenote: Practical measures for the speedy foundation of the State.]

They will begin by sending out into the country all the *541A* inhabitants

of the city who are more than ten years old, and will take possession of

their children, who will be unaffected by the habits of their parents;

these they will train in their own habits and laws, I mean in the laws

which we have given them: and in this way the State and constitution of

which we were speaking will soonest and most easily attain happiness, and

the nation which has such a constitution will gain most.

Yes, that will be the best way. And I think, Socrates, *541B* that you

have very well described how, if ever, such a constitution might come into

being. {246}

Enough then of the perfect State, and of the man who bears its

image--there is no difficulty in seeing how we shall describe him.

There is no difficulty, he replied; and I agree with you in thinking that

nothing more need be said.